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h i g h l i g h t s
• A non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in a public good.
• Besley and Ghatak (2001) consider the split-the-difference rule.
• They argue that the party who values the public good most should be the owner.
• We show the robustness of their insight when the deal-me-out solution is used.
• Our finding is in contrast to private good settings.
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a b s t r a c t
Consider a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can invest in a public good. Should the government
or the NGO own the public project? In an incomplete contracting framework with split-the-difference
bargaining, Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party who values the public goodmost should be the
owner. We demonstrate the robustness of their insight when the split-the-difference rule is replaced by
the deal-me-out solution. Our finding is in contrast to the private good results of Chiu (1998) and DeMeza
and Lockwood (1998), who show that the optimal ownership structure crucially depends on whether the
split-the-difference rule or the deal-me-out solution is used.
© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).l1. Introduction
The responsibility for providing public goods is often delegated
to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The question then
naturally arises: Should the state maintain ownership, or should
the NGO become the owner, in particular when the NGO is also the
key investor?
Our analysis of the optimal ownership structure is rooted in
the property rights approach based on incomplete contracting
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0/).(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995),
which has become the leading paradigm in the modern theory of
the firm.1 The simplest version of the basic property rights model
works as follows. Consider two parties who can generate a surplus
when they collaborate tomorrow. If the parties will not agree on
collaboration, the party who owns the relevant assets will still be
able to generate a surplus, albeit smaller than the collaboration
surplus. Suppose that today one of the two parties has to make an
important investment decision. The central result of the property
rights theory is that this party should be the owner. The reason
is that tomorrow the parties will agree to collaborate and divide
1 See Segal and Whinston (2013) for a comprehensive survey of the related
literature.
e under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.
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Relation to the literature.
Private goods Public goods
Split-the-difference Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) Besley and Ghatak (2001)
Deal-me-out Chiu (1998) and De Meza and Lockwood (1998) This paperTable 2
The parties’ payoffs.
Payoff of party G Payoff of party N
Collaboration θGy(i)− t θNy(i)+ t
Default, o = G θGλGy(i) θNλGy(i)
Default, o = N θGλNy(i) θNλNy(i)
the collaboration surplus according to the split-the-difference rule.
Hence, each party gets its disagreement payoff plus half of the
additional surplus that is generated by collaboration. Ownership
thus increases the share of the total surplus that a party will get
tomorrow, so the investing party should be the owner in order to
improve its incentives to invest.
In the present paper, we bring together two important variants
of the basic incomplete contracting model (see Table 1).
First, Chiu (1998) and De Meza and Lockwood (1998) have
shown that the conclusions of the basic property rights model
crucially rely on whether the ex post negotiations between the
parties are modeled using the split-the-difference rule or the deal-
me-out solution.2 According to the deal-me-out solution, each party
gets half of the collaboration surplus, except when one party’s
disagreement payoff is larger than half of the collaboration surplus.
In the latter case, the partywith the large disagreement payoff gets
its disagreement payoff, while the other party is residual claimant.
If the bargaining solution is given by the deal-me-out rule, then it
may be optimal to make the non-investing party the owner of the
relevant assets, which is never the case in the standard property
rightsmodel.3 In particular, if the non-investing party is the owner,
then the investing party can become residual claimant, so it may
even have first-best investment incentives.
Second, Besley and Ghatak (2001) have applied the property
rights approach to a public goods setting.4 In this setting, even the
non-owner gets a surplus in the case of disagreement, since the
owner provides a public good. Besley and Ghatak (2001) follow the
standard property rights approach in assuming that the bargaining
outcome is given by the split-the-difference rule. It turns out that
in Besley and Ghatak’s (2001) model the party who has a larger
valuation of the public good should always be the owner, even
when the other party is the key investor.
The goal of the present contribution is to investigate whether
Besley and Ghatak’s (2001) important insights are robust when the
split-the-difference rule is replaced by the deal-me-out rule. Is it
still true that the party who values the public good most should
always be the owner, or does the optimal ownership structure
crucially depend on whether the split-the-difference rule or the
2 We follow the wording of Binmore et al. (1989), which is also used by De Meza
and Lockwood (1998).
3 Giving ownership to a non-investing party may also be optimal in property
rights models in which the investing party has private information about its
disagreement payoff (see Schmitz, 2006).
4 For variants of theirmodel, see e.g. Halonen-Akatwijuka and Pafilis (2009, 2014)
on repeated games and location choice, Grosjean (2010) on maintenance costs,
Francesconi and Muthoo (2011) on impure public goods, and Halonen-Akatwijuka
(2012) on indispensable agents. On optimal ownership structures in models where
the private party does not directly care about the public good, see also Hart et al.
(1997) and Hoppe and Schmitz (2010).deal-me-out solution is applied, as it is the case in a private goods
framework? Moreover, may the deal-me-out solution even yield
first-best investment incentives for a party as in the case of private
goods?
These questions are important, since the deal-me-out solution
may be at least as plausible as the split-the-difference rule.5 In
laboratory experiments, the deal-me-out solution predicts well,
as has been emphasized by Binmore et al. (1989). There are
convincing non-cooperative bargaining games in support of each
of the two sharing rules. For instance, in Chiu and Yang’s (1999)
infinite horizon bargaining game, the choice between the two
approaches depends on the length of time that taking an outside
option restricts a party from reverting to collaboration with the
other party.6
2. The model
There are two parties, G (the government) and N (a non-
governmental organization, NGO). At an initial date 0, the parties
agree on an ownership structure o ∈ {G,N}. At date 1, the NGO
chooses an observable but non-contractible investment level i ≥ 0.
In line with the incomplete contracting approach (Grossman and
Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995), it is assumed that
ex ante it is not possible to write a contract that specifies ex post
collaboration of the parties.7
At date 2, the parties can write a contract specifying collabora-
tion to provide a public good. If the twoparties agree to collaborate,
they together provide the quantity y(i) of the public good, where
y(0) = 0, y′(0) = ∞, y′(∞) = 0, and y′′ < 0. If the parties do
not collaborate at date 2, the provided quantity of the public good
depends on the ownership structure. In particular, in the case of
disagreement the quantity of the public good is λNy(i) if o = N
and λGy(i) if o = G, where 0 < λG < λN ≤ 1. Note that collab-
oration is always ex post efficient. Moreover, since the NGO is the
investing party, in the case of disagreement a larger fraction of the
NGO’s investments can be used when the NGO is the owner.
Let the government’s valuation of the public good be denoted
by θG > 0, while the non-governmental organization’s valuation
is denoted by θN > 0. Thus, the parties’ payoffs are as depicted in
Table 2, where t is a transfer payment from the government to the
NGO.
The first best-benchmark. Note that the total surplus (θG +
θN)y(i) − i is maximized by the investment level iFB, which is
implicitly characterized by the first-order condition (θG + θN)
y′(iFB) = 1.
5 Moreover, the questions are also interesting as De Meza and Lockwood (2004)
have shown that even in the case of the deal-me-out solution the investing party
should always be the ownerwhen there are sufficiently strong spillovers in a private
good setting. One might hence suspect that this result carries over to the case of
public goods. Yet, we will show that this is not the case.
6 See also Muthoo (1999), who provides comprehensive discussions of non-
cooperative bargaining games with alternating offers that may lead to the split-
the-difference or the deal-me-out division.
7 For detailed discussions of the incomplete contracting paradigm, see Hart and
Moore (1999) and Maskin and Tirole (1999).
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Besley and Ghatak (2001) follow the standard property rights
approach and apply the split-the-difference rule tomodel the date-
2 negotiations. Hence, under ownership structure o ∈ {G,N}, at
date 2 the parties agree on a transfer payment t such that each
party gets its default payoff plus half of the renegotiation surplus
(θG + θN)y(i)− (θG + θN)λoy(i).
Thus, given ownership structure o ∈ {G,N}, the NGO’s ex ante
payoff is given by
θNλoy(i)+ 12 (θG + θN)(1− λo)y(i)− i
and the government’s payoff is given by
θGλoy(i)+ 12 (θG + θN)(1− λo)y(i).
As a consequence, at date 1 the NGO chooses the investment level
io, which is implicitly characterized by
1
2
[θG + θN + λo(θN − θG)]y′(io) = 1.
Note that there is always underinvestment compared to the
first-best solution, because the NGO’s marginal return 12 [θG+ θN +
λo(θN − θG)] is smaller than the social marginal return θG + θN .
Moreover, observe that iG ≥ iN whenever θG ≥ θN , because
1
2
[θG + θN + λG(θN − θG)] ≥ 12 [θG + θN + λN(θN − θG)]
⇐⇒ 0 ≥ (λN − λG)(θN − θG)
⇐⇒ θG ≥ θN .
Due to concavity of the total surplus, this means that it is always
optimal that the party who has a larger valuation of the public
good is the owner. In particular, even though the NGO is the
investing party, ownership by the government can be optimal,
which is in contrast to the standard property rights theory with
private goods.8 Intuitively, when party G has a larger valuation of
the public good, then N ’s investment improves the default payoff
and thus the bargaining position of party G more than its own
bargaining position, so making party G the owner is optimal as
this reduces the impact of the default payoffs on the bargaining
outcome.
4. Deal-me-out
We now explore whether Besley and Ghatak’s (2001) central
insight is robust when we replace the split-the-difference rule by
the deal-me-out solution.
Thus, we now suppose that at date 2 the parties split the
collaboration surplus (θG + θN)y(i) equally, except when one
party’s default payoff is larger than half of the collaboration
surplus.9If party G’s default payoff θGλoy(i) is larger than
8 Schmitz (2013) has shown that when the regular Nash bargaining solution
is replaced by the generalized Nash bargaining solution (i.e., if the renegotiation
surplus is split unequally), then Besley and Ghatak’s (2001) result that the party
who values the public good most should always be the owner no longer holds. Yet,
it is still true that only the relationship between θG and θN matters for the optimal
ownership structure, while the investment technology is irrelevant (i.e., in contrast
to the private good case,N-ownership is not always optimal, even though only party
N has to make a relevant investment decision).
9 Note that it is not possible that both parties’ default payoffs are larger than
half of the collaboration surplus, because the sum of the default payoffs θGλoy(i)+
θNλoy(i) cannot be larger than the collaboration surplus (θG + θN )y(i).1
2 (θG + θN)y(i), then party G gets its default payoff θGλoy(i) and
party N is residual claimant, i.e. it gets (θG + θN)y(i) − θGλoy(i).
Analogously, if party N ’s default payoff θNλoy(i) is larger than
1
2 (θG + θN)y(i), then party N gets θNλoy(i) and party G gets (θG +
θN)y(i)− θNλoy(i).
Hence, given ownership structure o ∈ {G,N}, the NGO’s ex ante
payoff is given by
uNo (i|θG, θN) =

1
2
(θG + θN)y(i)− i
if max{θNλo, θGλo} ≤ 12 (θG + θN),
θNλoy(i)− i
if θGλo <
1
2
(θG + θN) < θNλo,
(θG + θN)y(i)− θGλoy(i)− i
if θNλo <
1
2
(θG + θN) < θGλo,
and the government’s payoff is given by
uGo (i|θG, θN) =

1
2
(θG + θN)y(i)
if max{θNλo, θGλo} ≤ 12 (θG + θN),
(θG + θN)y(i)− θNλoy(i)
if θGλo <
1
2
(θG + θN) < θNλo,
θGλoy(i)
if θNλo <
1
2
(θG + θN) < θGλo.
We can now analyze the NGO’s investment decision at date 1.
Suppose first that θG ≥ θN . In this case, the NGO maximizes
uNo (i|θG, θN) =

1
2
(θG + θN)y(i)− i
if θGλo ≤ 12 (θG + θN),
(θG + θN)y(i)− θGλoy(i)− i
if
1
2
(θG + θN) < θGλo.
Thus, the investment level is characterized by
1
2
(θG + θN)y′(io) = 1 if λo ≤ 12 (1+ θN/θG)
and
[(1− λo)θG + θN ]y′(io) = 1 if λo > 12 (1+ θN/θG).
Observe that if λN ≤ 12 (1+ θN/θG), then the investment level is
given by 12 (θG+θN)y′(io) = 1 regardless of the ownership structure
o ∈ {G,N}. If λG > 12 (1 + θN/θG), then o = G is the optimal
ownership structure, since
(1− λN)θG + θN < (1− λG)θG + θN < θG + θN .
Note that there is always underinvestmentwith regard to the first-
best benchmark, so concavity of the total surplus implies that the
ownership structure that leads to the larger investment level is
optimal. Finally, o = G is also optimal if λG ≤ 12 (1+ θN/θG) < λN ,
because in this case
(1− λN)θG + θN < 12 (θG + θN) < θG + θN
holds.
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θG ≥ θN , then the investment level is characterized by 12 [θG+ θN +
λG(θN − θG)]y′(iG) = 1. Note that the investment level is larger in
the case of the deal-me-out solution, because both 12 (θG + θN) and
(1− λG)θG + θN are larger than 12 [θG + θN + λG(θN − θG)].
Suppose next that θG < θN , so the NGO maximizes
uNo (i|θG, θN) =

1
2
(θG + θN)y(i)− i
if θNλo ≤ 12 (θG + θN),
θNλoy(i)− i
if
1
2
(θG + θN) < θNλo.
In this case, the investment level is characterized by
1
2
(θG + θN)y′(io) = 1 if λo ≤ 12 (1+ θG/θN)
and
θNλoy′(io) = 1 if λo > 12 (1+ θG/θN).
Note that if λN ≤ 12 (1 + θG/θN), then the investment level is
given by 12 (θG + θN)y′(io) = 1 regardless of the ownership struc-
ture. If λG > 12 (1 + θG/θN), then o = N is the optimal ownership
structure, because
θNλG < θNλN < θG + θN .
Finally, if λG ≤ 12 (1 + θG/θN) < λN , then again o = N is optimal,
since
1
2
(θG + θN) < θNλN < θG + θN .
In the case of the split-the-difference rule, if θG < θN , then
the investment level is implicitly given by 12 [θG + θN + λN(θN −
θG)]y′(iN) = 1. Note that the investment level is smaller in the case
of the deal-me-out solution, because both 12 (θG+θN) and θNλN are
smaller than 12 [θG + θN + λN(θN − θG)].
To summarize, the following results hold.
Proposition 1. Suppose the outcome of the date-2 negotiations is
given by the deal-me-out solution.
(i) It is always optimal to let the party who values the public good
most be the owner.
(ii) The NGO’s investment level is larger than in the case of the split-
the-difference rule if ownership by the government is optimal.
Otherwise, the investment level is smaller than in the case of the
split-the-difference rule.
(iii) The investment level is always strictly smaller than the first-best
benchmark.
5. Conclusions
Besley and Ghatak (2001) have shown that in the case of public
goods, ownership should reside with the party that cares mostabout the project, even if the other party is the key investor. We
have demonstrated that Besley and Ghatak’s (2001) central insight
is robust when the split-the-difference rule is replaced by the deal-
me-out solution.10 Our finding thus highlights another important
difference between the public good and the private good settings,
as Chiu (1998) andDeMeza and Lockwood (1998) have shown that
the central insights of the property rights theory are not robust
with regard to the deal-me-out solution in the case of private
goods. Moreover, it has turned out that in contrast to the case of
private goods, with public goods it is not possible to provide first-
best investment incentives, even when the bargaining outcome is
given by the deal-me-out solution.
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